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Abstract: German electricity giants have recently taken high-level decisions to remove 
selected fossil fuel operations from their company portfolio. This new corporate strategy 
could be seen as a direct response to the growing global influence of the fossil fuel 
divestment campaign. In this paper we ask whether the divestment movement currently 
exerts significant influence on decision-making at the top four German energy  
giants—E.On, RWE, Vattenfall and EnBW. We find that this is not yet the case. After 
describing the trajectory of the global fossil fuel divestment campaign, we outline four 
alternative influences on corporate strategy that, currently, are having a greater impact than 
the divestment movement on Germany’s power sector. In time, however, clear political 
decisions and strong civil support may increase the significance of climate change 
concerns in the strategic management of the German electricity giants. 
Keywords: carbon management; fossil fuel divestment; strategic decision-making; 
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1. Introduction 
In late 2014, at the time of the Lima Climate Summit, Germany’s largest electricity provider, E.ON, 
surprised the financial world with the spectacular announcement that the company would shed all of its 
nuclear and fossil fuel assets and focus exclusively on renewable energy generation. To do so, 
company activities will be split into two independent entities. From 2016, E.ON’s fossil fuel and 
nuclear generation will be carried out by a new company called Uniper, while the original E.ON will 
concentrate on renewables, electricity distribution networks and customer service [1]. 
This announcement shows that the once so successful business model of Germany’s electricity 
giants is becoming increasingly outdated. Pressure from the government’s energy transition policy, the 
German Energiewende, has had a drastic effect on company strategy and finance. This policy renders 
nuclear power in Germany obsolete by 2022 and, more recently, has become a challenge for energy 
production from coal. This latest initiative has prompted a discussion on reducing emissions from the 
energy sector by 22 million tonnes of CO2 by 2020, which is equivalent to shutting down about eight 
coal-fired power plants [2]. Furthermore, in order to reach its Energiewende and climate objectives,  
the German government has set several targets that should guide climate and energy policies up until 
2050. By 2020, Germany is aiming to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 40% compared to 1990 levels, 
which means a reduction of about 500 Mt CO2e. Between 1990 and 2014, Germany reduced emissions 
by about 24.7% [2]. However, given that over the past two years emissions have actually increased,  
the government plans to implement additional measures such as a climate levy. 
As German energy giants have come under pressure from the government, the international 
financial sector has become increasingly concerned about a potential carbon bubble. This phenomenon 
is based on the notion that if the 2 °C global warming target is taken seriously by international 
politicians, “no more than one-third of proven reserves of fossil fuels can be consumed prior to 2050” [3]. 
This means leaving one third of proven global oil reserves, half of the gas reserves and some eighty per 
cent of coal reserves in the ground between 2010 and 2050 [4]. As a result, a large amount of fossil 
fuel companies’ assets would be ‘stranded’ and these companies would be considered over-valued.  
In this context, a recently published report from the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) analysed 
sixteen European electricity companies to assess their future low-carbon potential. The ranking 
focused on four key areas: carbon risk, renewable energy sources, coal exposure and water risk. The 
German companies noted above were rated poorly, with E.ON ranked nine, EnBW ranked 12 and 
RWE ranked 13 (Vattenfall was not included). The main reason for their poor performance was their 
high dependence on coal reserves and therefore high carbon cost exposure: a carbon price rising to  
18 Euros would make these companies extremely vulnerable, the report stated. Based on their Earnings 
Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) in 2013, 43% of RWE’s earnings would be at risk, followed by 
EnBW (28%) and E.ON (18%). The CDP report argued that with climate policies becoming stricter, 
carbon costs would increase, causing these companies to become an investment risk [5]. 
The fossil fuel divestment campaign has emerged as an attempt to convince investors to rid 
themselves of fossil fuel-based company shares in their portfolios. This has led to company business 
models being questioned and branded unsustainable.  
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Given the most recent announcements by German energy giants to rid themselves of carbon assets, 
we ask the research question: are key strategic decisions at the four largest German energy companies 
being influenced by the global fossil fuel divestment campaign? Our answer is: “not quite yet”.  
Beginning with a methodology section showing that we base our insights on qualitative data 
collected through interviews and participatory observation as well as publicly available statistical data, 
we present a short overview of the fossil fuel divestment campaign in our findings section. We then 
illustrate that four factors other than the divestment campaign are having greater influence on the top 
level strategic management decisions at German energy giants. Our conclusions summarise our 
findings and suggest that while the influence of the campaign on German electricity companies may be 
less noticeable than in other countries, there is evidence that this could change in the future.  
2. Methodology  
The findings presented in this paper are based on the triangulation of data. We used primary data 
from expert interviews and participatory observations at two official company events to deepen our 
understanding of the general attitudes that prevail at the examined companies. We used secondary data 
provided by companies and government sources to underpin our arguments. In terms of the latter data, 
we extracted relevant figures and statistics directly from annual reports, official sustainability reports 
and government data. These are featured in the paper.  
The qualitative data collection took place over two years and enabled us to gain an insight into 
decision making at the strategic level at the four German energy giants. The empirical work was 
carried out in three phases. Firstly, a desk review study of official company communication was 
conducted to establish the development of climate policy at the four companies and the companies’ 
relationships with external stakeholders. Secondly, a pilot of three interviews was completed, to refine 
the questionnaire, gain a better understanding of the German electricity market and prepare for the 
analysis of the expert interviews. Finally, seven expert interviews with representatives from the four 
companies were conducted between August and October 2011. The interviews were on average  
60 minutes long, were fully transcribed and analysed using a summarising qualitative content analysis. 
They covered the political situation in Germany, including the effects of the Energiewende and the 
government’s promotion of renewable energy, and climate policy issues within the company.  
All interviews and the participatory observation were led by the first author of this paper. Much of the 
qualitative data forming the basis of this paper was published in an earlier, extensive study of corporate 
climate policy but is available in German only [6]. 
3. Findings 
3.1. The Fossil Fuel Divestment Campaign 
Over the past months and recent years, several organisations, such as fossilfreeindexes.com, the 
Carbon Tracker Initiative and the Stranded Assets Programme at the University of Oxford’s Smith 
School of Enterprise and the Environment, have analysed the financial risk of fossil fuel companies.  
A social movement called the fossil fuel divestment campaign has been encouraging institutional and 
private investors to sell shares in companies that use fossil fuels in their energy or industrial 
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production. Investors at universities and churches have been at the forefront of the campaign and now, 
this is becoming increasingly prominent among investment funds and banks. Table 1 shows examples 
of institutions reacting to this call for divestment.  
Table 1. Examples of institutions implementing fossil fuel divestment [7–9].  
Institution Year Amount 
Divested 
Action 
University of 
Stanford 
2014 $21.4bn 
endowment 
 After a petition by the student-led organisation ‘Fossil 
Free Stanford’ and the recommendation of Stanford’s 
Advisory Panel on Investment Responsibility and 
Licensing (APIRL), the Stanford Board of Trustees decide 
against direct investments in coal mining companies 
Rockefeller 
Brothers Fund 
2014 $50bn  In September 2014, the heirs to the Standard Oil fortune join 
the campaign and divest a total of $50bn from fossil fuels 
The Bank of 
England  
2015 -  Warns insurance companies of “assets that could be left 
‘stranded’ by policy changes which limit the use of fossil 
fuels” [7] 
The Church of 
England 
2015 £9bn fund  
(to divest 
£12m from tar 
sands oil and 
thermal coal) 
 In May 2015, the Church of England announces, that it 
will divest its holdings of £12m in thermal coal and tar 
sands. The Church bans investments in any company that 
make more than 10% of their revenue from thermal coal 
and tar sands 
Norway’s 
Sovereign 
Wealth Fund  
2015 Worth an 
estimated 
$850bn; Coal 
divestment: 
about $4.5bn 
is being 
discussed 
 The $900-billion fund does not officially affiliate with the 
campaign 
 Nevertheless, the fund establishes higher climate change 
standards for companies in which it invests, and divests 
from more than 100 companies with unsustainable 
business models [8] 
 May 2015: announces that it will divest from companies 
which generate more than 30% of their revenue from coal 
HSBC 2015 -  Analyses the risks of stranded assets and concludes that 
due to climate change regulation, as well as technological 
advancements and innovations in efficiency, the energy 
mix is expected to alter in the coming years, “potentially 
resulting in further stranding of high carbon and high cost 
fossil fuels” [9] 
 Coal assets form the highest risk as they face greater 
regulatory risks, high emissions and substitution 
possibilities [9] 
The movement originated with a call by Bill McKibben of the 350.org project, published in Rolling 
Stone Magazine, to divest from fossil fuels. His 2012 article [10] argued that at current levels of fossil 
fuel extraction, the human race will face hardship as the climate becomes unpredictable and irregular. 
He asserted that carbon emissions from all known fossil fuel reserves about to be exploited would play 
havoc with the climate. McKibben subsequently founded the fossil fuel divestment campaign, which 
has become highly vocal in encouraging private and institutional investors to divest. Although it may 
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not yet be influencing companies directly, the naming and shaming of oil, gas and coal-based businesses 
is stigmatising these firms. This could adversely affect their lending rates and political influence [11]. 
This fossil fuel divestment campaign has since received support from the United Nations climate 
secretariat [12]. The United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon declared at a press  
conference: “I have been urging companies like pension funds or insurance companies to reduce their 
investments in coal and a fossil-fuel based economy to move to renewable sources of energy.” [13]. 
Critics, however, claim that divestment campaigns, like the one described above or the Guardian 
newspaper’s ‘Leave it in the Ground’ initiative, may be doing more harm than good. Critical voices [14] 
note that shareholders, as the owners of companies, have the power to influence the management of 
these firms. In other words, investment equals control. Divestment campaigns therefore “turn an inside 
voice that can demand that a company listen into an outside voice that a company can easily ignore” [14]. 
Furthermore, Devinney [14] points out that divestment has no influence on the ability to invest, as the 
shares that are sold do not affect a company’s cash flow. 
3.2. The Campaign’s Influence on Germany’s Electricity Sector  
For a long time, the majority of Germany’s power sector, or more precisely, Germany’s four biggest 
power companies, relied on gas and particularly on coal. Two of the companies (RWE and Vattenfall) 
relied heavily on lignite, the most CO2-intensive fossil fuel, to help fulfil Germany’s energy demand. 
To counterbalance their carbon account, these companies have recently based a significant part of their 
portfolio on nuclear energy and have slowly started investing in renewables. In the recent past, Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS) technology used to also be an important technology option for the four 
companies, to reduce their CO2 emissions without giving up fossil fuels. However, the future of this 
technology in Germany is now doubtful (for more information on CCS in Germany, see e.g., [15,16]) 
and, in light of the German energy transition, nuclear energy is no longer an option: The remaining 
nuclear power plants will be phased out by 2022. 
German electricity giants have recently taken high-level decisions to remove selected fossil fuel 
operations from their portfolio of company activity. This corporate strategy could be a response to the 
growing global influence of the fossil fuel divestment campaign. We find, though, that the following 
reasons are more plausible in explaining this situation and why, at the moment, the influence of the 
campaign might not be as strong as it is in other Western countries. 
4. Discussion 
The four companies examined here have recently taken high-level decisions to remove selected 
fossil fuel operations from their portfolio of company activity. We summarise implemented and 
scheduled plans briefly in Table 2. 
These developments could be attributed to the divestment campaign, as they seem to be in line with 
the campaign’s aims. However, we find that four alternative factors, which we call ‘influencers’,  
have had more impact on company decision making than the fossil fuel divestment campaign.  
Energies 2015, 8 9625 
 
 
Table 2. The four companies’ decisions to remove selected fossil fuel operations from 
their portfolio [17,18]. 
Company Decisions 
E.ON  Plans to spin-off its fossil fuel and nuclear generation business in 2016 to a new 
company, Uniper 
 Focuses on renewables, electricity distribution networks and service for 
customers under the E.ON brand 
RWE  Decommissions several power stations (e.g., Goldenbergwerk, Westfalen C and 
Gersteinwerk K2) 
 Initiates the long-term mothballing of others (e.g. Gersteinwerk F+G and 
Weisweiler G+H) 
 Resolves several divestment decisions (selling off district heating sector of 
Essent, RWE’s Dutch subsidiary, and RWE-DEA, the gas and crude oil 
production subsidiary) 
Vattenfall  Plans to sell the lignite generation plants and mines in eastern Germany 
 Has already divested in a number of operations, such as its heat and electricity 
network businesses in Poland and Finland 
EnBW  Expands its divestiture programme to a total of €2.6 billion for the period from 
2013 to 2015 
 Plans to shut down 686 MW in fossil power plants in Southern Germany 
(Marbach and Walheim) (As those power plants are deemed “system-relevant”, 
the German Federal Network Agency (BNetzA) has prohibited their 
decommissioning until 2016)  
Influencer 1: Electricity Prices  
Several considerations have prompted these shifts in the business strategies of the four companies, 
with the drop in electricity prices and subsequent fall in profit margins likely to be the primary driver. 
The rising share of renewable energies, illustrated in Figure 1, puts wholesale electricity prices under 
pressure, as the so-called merit order, which represents marginal supply costs of different technologies, 
is shifted to the right [19].  
 
Figure 1. Development of renewable energy share of gross electricity consumption in Germany [20]. 
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A study by Germany’s Institute for Future Energy Systems (IZES), on behalf of the German Solar 
Industry Association (BSW-Solar), found that prices dropped despite power demand remaining 
unchanged. Furthermore, there was an observable alignment between the peak and base price, which 
used to be 20 to 25% apart. This was a direct result of the instalment of photovoltaic panels which led 
to a reduction of the electricity price on the power exchange by 520 to 840 million Euro [21]. Figure 2 
shows the overall development of the day-ahead price at the German power exchange between 2002 
and 2014.  
 
Figure 2. Weekly Day-Ahead maximum and minimum prices, Update: December 2014 [22]. 
Occasionally, the European Energy Exchange (EEX) even shows negative prices in times of low 
demand, reflecting high amounts of inflexible power generation, which cannot be shut down and 
restarted in a timely manner or at reasonable cost. “Frequent occurrences of negative prices in many 
European markets signal the need for better integration of renewables into the power grid. On a 
Sunday afternoon in mid-June wind and solar assured more than 60% of power generation in 
Germany, resulting in negative hourly prices in the whole CWE region” [23].  
The Fraunhofer ISE Institute revealed that in Germany, hours with low prices (<10 €/MWh) 
quadrupled between the first half of 2013 compared to the first half of 2012, and that hours with 
negative prices have risen by nearly 50% [24]. They conclude that more flexibility is needed in the 
conventional power plant complex for a successful energy transition. 
As a consequence of this trend, these companies have been, and are still, losing money from the 
operation of their conventional power plants. The new challenges, accompanied by the high percentage 
of fluctuating energy sources, demand new business models and strategies (key words are smart grids, 
load or demand-side management and electricity storage, as well as highly flexible fossil-fuel  
reserve power). Critics often blame high renewable subsidies for overcapacity in the market and 
decreasing electricity prices. A recent working paper from the IMF, however, puts this argument in 
perspective, showing that fossil fuels are actually subsidised by a stunning $5.3tn. This dwarfs global 
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renewable energy subsidies, which are estimated at $120bn [25]. In fact, the IMF notes that the 
abolition of fossil fuel subsidies globally would reduce CO2 emissions by more than 20% [26]. In 
Germany, subsidies for energy supply and consumption amounted to €21.6bn in 2010. The German 
Umweltbundesamt, the federal environmental agency, which provided these figures, points out that as 
these subsidies have a market-distorting effect, they simultaneously increase the need for renewable 
energy funding [27]. In Germany, renewable energies especially benefit through the German 
Renewable Energy Sources Act which provides remuneration not as a subsidy as such because it is not 
financed by taxes. Instead it is paid by every customer through a Renewable Energy Sources Act EEG 
surcharge, which is included in the electricity bill (in 2014: 6.24 ct/kWh, in 2015: 6.17 ct/kWh) [28].  
Influencer 2: Company Ownership 
The carbon divestment campaign mainly focuses on publicly listed companies but of the four 
companies examined here, only two, RWE and E.ON, are publicly listed and affected by the campaign. 
EnBW is de facto publicly listed, but the equity is actually divided between NECKARPRI 
Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH (46.75% of the shares), which is 100% owned by the state of  
Baden-Württemberg (in south-west Germany) and OEW Energie-Beteiligungs GmbH (46.75% of the 
shares), a coalition of regional corporations and municipalities. EnBW holds about 2% of its own shares.  
A closer look at the privately owned companies, EnBW and Vattenfall, shows that their business 
decisions seem to be in line with the divestment campaign’s aim: Vattenfall is planning to sell its 
lignite generation plants and mines in eastern Germany, and EnBW has expanded its divestiture 
programme to a total of €2.6 billion for the period from 2013 to 2015. EnBW is also planning to shut 
down fossil fuel power plants. The reasons behind these companies’ decisions are generally accepted 
to be government policy-related. The green-red coalition in the federal state of Baden-Württemberg is 
the driver for EnBW’s change of course and the Swedish government, which owns Vattenfall AB,  
has prompted Vattenfall’s restructuring plans. 
Influencer 3: Government Regulation  
Electricity generation is a highly regulated policy field in Germany. The federal government has 
mapped out its Energy Policy up to the year 2050 very precisely as can be seen in Figure 3: 
Figure 3 shows that by 2020 renewables are to have a share of at least 35% in gross electricity 
consumption, a 50% share by 2030, 65% by 2040 and 80% by 2050. For gross final energy 
consumption, the targets are 18% by 2020, a 30% share by 2030, 45% by 2040 and 60% by 2050. 
Compared to 2008, heat demand in buildings is to be reduced by 20% by 2020, while primary energy 
demand is to fall by 80% by 2050. For greenhouse gases, a reduction of 80% until 2050 is the target. 
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Figure 3. Long-term, comprehensive energy and climate targets set by the German 
government in 2010 [29]. 
Renewables have formed an important part of German energy policies for more than two decades. 
In 1991, Germany enacted the Grid Feed-In Law (German: Stromeinspeisungsgesetz, StromEinspG) 
obliging energy companies to purchase electricity from renewable energy sources at minimum prices. 
This law was replaced by the Renewable Energy Sources Act (German: Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, 
EEG) in 2000, which aimed to increase the share of renewable energies in German electricity 
generation. The EEG was amended and revised in the years 2004, 2009, 2012 and 2014. The revised 
version of the EEG is a crucial part of the German energy transition, as it “aims to substantially slow 
any further rise in costs, to systematically steer the expansion of renewable energy, and to bring 
renewable energy more and more to the market” [30].  
Under this energy policy, the four large German electricity companies have had to reinvent their 
portfolio of activities as their nuclear assets and high shares of coal generation are incompatible with 
the political vision. This is unlike the UK, that introduced a capacity market system, where a payment 
is provided not only for electricity generation, but for the provision of reliable sources of capacity [31]. 
Such a model is unlikely to be introduced in Germany, as “overcapacities currently amount to roughly 
60 gigawatts in the electricity market region relevant for Germany” [32]—largely due to the rising 
share of renewable energies. The share of nuclear energy in the gross electricity production has already 
decreased from 22.2% (before Fukushima) to 15.8%. Over the same period (2010 to 2014) the share of 
renewables has increased from 16.6% to 26.2% [33]. 
Although the capacity market is discussed in the Green Paper “An Electricity Market for Germany’s 
Energy Transition” the option “Electricity Market 2.0”, an optimised electricity market that provides 
enough incentive for the maintenance of sufficient capacity is favoured. “According to scientific 
studies, an optimised electricity market that allows undistorted price signals to reach market 
participants, and is safeguarded by a credible legal framework, is possible without an additional 
capacity market” [32]. In such a market the state is responsible for setting market rules: “through their 
specific demand, the electricity customers are independently responsible for determining the  
capacity level” [32]. 
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With this amount of overcapacity, electricity companies lose their negotiation tactic of threatening 
governments with withholding investments in the energy infrastructure.  
Policy is an important stakeholder of the company, but the owner or shareholder of a company still 
plays a significant role in business decisions. “Climate change has become one of the most financially 
significant environmental concerns facing investors” [34]. This is especially true for the electricity 
sector because the investment pressure on companies “is increasing as investors express their concerns 
about regulatory uncertainty and price volatility facing the industry” [34]. Roosevelt/Llewelyn point 
out that in recent years, investors have been the first to see the opportunities of a new environmental era 
and were among the first to invest in sustainable energy companies [35]. This trend is likely to continue: 
“As resource limitations, especially related to fossil fuels, increasingly impinge on corporate performance, 
more investors will include a company’s environmental strategy as a variable in their analysis [36].  
Concerning shareholder involvement in business strategies–the inside voice as Devinney  
frames it [14]–there are certainly institutional investors using their voice to demand sustainable 
business decisions [37,38]. Schmidt/Speich reveal that at RWE’s 2009 general meeting, activist 
shareholders warned the company of the financial liability of emissions trading and of the high 
financial risk of involvement in Eastern European nuclear power plants like Belene. 
However, it remains to be seen whether their influence is sufficient to bring about major changes, 
such as a complete fossil fuel phase-out. A gradually greener investment and alignment may be the 
result of shareholder activism, but a majority of shareholders might not support drastic changes in the 
business model of their company. This is especially true for a company like RWE, where municipalities 
are the largest single shareholder with more than 15% [39]. Municipalities depend heavily on annual 
dividends. Nevertheless, the questioning of the business model of electricity companies by an important 
shareholder like the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund might influence and impact other funds as well [40].  
Influencer 4: Domestic Energy Sources 
Through the Energiewende, the German government decided to abandon nuclear energy while 
maintaining high industrial output. The renunciation of coal, as proposed by the divestment campaign 
and parts of the German policy with view to national climate targets, faces a strong pro-coal lobby. 
Renewable energies amount to a quarter of Germany’s gross electricity consumption yet lignite 
continues to be referred to as the only remaining domestic energy source in Germany. There are two 
large lignite deposits in the Rhineland (RWE) and in Lusatia (Vattenfall). Associated with this 
perspective is the national energy security agenda, as an energy self-sufficient Germany will generate 
jobs and wealth especially in regions that already face economic decline. Opponents of coal are facing 
powerful and diversified coal advocates, including not only the electricity companies, but also unions, 
local politicians and concerned citizens.  
Lignite is the most important fossil fuel domestic energy source. The strong global coal lobby 
becomes even more vocal when political plans challenge lignite as a power source, just as it does when 
a potential climate levy for old coal-fired power stations is discussed. RWE’s CEO Peter Terium 
predicted that this proposal “will introduce a total exit from lignite in the short run. Not only power 
plants, but also the associated open-cast mines and operations, would need to be closed down.” As a result, 
“restructuring costs for the companies affected would run into the billions” [41]. A study 
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commissioned by DEBRIV, the German association of all lignite producing companies and their 
affiliated organisations, found that that 40,000 jobs could be at risk if coal was phased out in Germany [42]. 
One reason behind the idea of a climate levy on coal is the high specific emission factor of lignite, 
which is listed in Table 3. 
Table 3. Fossil fuel CO2 emission factor in the German electricity mix [43]. 
FUEL/UNIT 
CO2 Emission 
Factor Related 
to Fuel Input 
(g/kWh) 
Fuel Utilisation Rate 
in 2011 Related to 
Electricity 
Consumption (%) 
CO2 Emission Factor 
in 2011 Related to 
Electricity 
Consumption (g/kWh) 
Comparison CO2 
Emission Factor 
Electricity Mix 
2011 (g/kWh) 
Gas 202 52% 388 
558 Hard Coal 339 38% 892 
Lignite 404 35% 1,169 
Of Germany’s ten power stations with the highest CO2 emissions, nine use lignite [44]. The share of 
lignite in German electricity generation slightly increased after the first nuclear power plants were 
decommissioned, not least because of the low CO2 certificate price under the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) [44]. A letter from 80 municipal electricity companies expressed their 
support for the plans of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy for the climate levy. 
The letter referred to the pending structural change in the energy sector, as the CO2 reduction targets 
have been known for at least eight years. “The national and European climate protection targets can 
only be reached if, in addition to efficiency gains in the heating and transport sector, electricity 
generation in Germany is largely decarbonised by 2050” [45].  
Despite this support, the lobby for lignite is strong. The original aim of the Ministry for Economic 
Affairs and Energy was to save 22 million tonnes of CO2 emissions but this target was subsequently 
reduced to 16 million tonnes. The remaining 6 million tonnes of CO2 emissions ought to be achieved 
using cogeneration power plants [46]. At the time of writing this paper, the responsible ministry is 
planning to mothball some lignite power plants (in total 2.7 GW) in order to keep them as a capacity 
reserve until 2020 [47], so instead of imposing an additional levy on these power plants–the 
government’s original plan to help achieve international climate targets–the electricity companies now 
receive a cost-based compensation. 
This example illustrates the broad support from different actors for Germany’s most important fossil 
fuel domestic energy source. The fossil fuel divestment campaign is therefore facing resistance. NGOs, 
including Urgewald or Germanwatch, have faced similar obstacles in calling for a complete phase out 
of coal. That said, the transition of lignite power plants into a capacity reserve of limited duration can 
be viewed as a first step towards such a phase out.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we show that the current generation portfolios of the four largest German energy 
companies are heavily based on the fossil fuels gas, hard coal and lignite. E.ON’s portfolio features 
53% fossil fuels, RWE generates 76% of its energy from fossil fuels, Vattenfall 73% and EnBW 50% 
(see Table 4). In particular, the high share of energy generation from lignite, which is considered the 
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dirtiest fossil fuel, justifiably labels those companies as ideal targets for the divestment campaign. 
Furthermore, the companies’ current business models do not seem fit for the pending challenge of 
climate change. Neither are they in line with the political agenda of the German government. 
Table 4 lists the structure of the power plant capacity in MW in Germany. 
Table 4. Power Plant Capacity of the four German companies [48–51]. 
 E.ON RWE Vattenfall EnBW 
Gas 3887 (22%) 4411 (17%) 1707 (10%) 1191 (9%) 
Hard Coal 4976 (28%) 5318 (20%) 2866 (17%) 4776 (35%) 
Lignite 500 (3%) 10,291 (39%) 7767 (46%) 875 (6%) 
Nuclear 5403 (30%) 3908 (15%) 771 (5%) 3333 (24%) 
Renewables * 2104 (12%) 55 (3,107 **) (0.2%) 124 *** (1%) 2632 (19%) 
Pumped Storage, Oil, Other 1136 (6%) 2537(10%) 3511 **** (21%) 941 (7%) 
TOTAL 18,006 (100%) 26,520 (100%) 16746 (100%) 13,748 (100%) 
* Comparatively high figures for E.ON and EnBW: E.ON only lists “Hydro”, therefore these figures entail 
pumped-storage power plants as well; EnBW lists “Storage/pumped storage power plants using the natural 
flow of water” as Renewables; ** Renewables division, figure for whole RWE Group; *** Wind and Biomass 
(Waste); **** Hydro power amounts to 2,880 MW alone, which are mainly pumped-storage power plants. 
Having said that, these companies have undertaken the first small steps to restructure: E.ON, for 
example, is now focussing on renewable energy while Vattenfall is selling lignite generation plants and 
mines in Eastern Germany. However, E.ON’s restructure could mean it avoids liabilities should falling 
profits from fossil fuel and nuclear energy generation force its new company, Uniper, into insolvency. 
Under the E.ON brand, the company can focus on future-proofed renewable energy technologies but if 
the costs of decommissioning nuclear plants and nuclear waste management are excessive,  
Uniper could become insolvent leaving the German taxpayer to foot the bill. 
In the most recent past, focussing on renewable energies has become an important business strategy. 
One indication is the establishment of new subsidiary companies by the four businesses examined here: 
-  E.ON Climate & Renewables (2007), 
-  RWE Innogy (2008), 
-  Vattenfall Europe New Energy GmbH (2007), 
-  EnBW Renewable Energies (2008). 
Furthermore, these companies invest in renewable energy technology every year as part of their 
overall investments as Tables 5–7 show. 
Table 5. E.ON–overall investment and share of investment in renewables [48,52–56]. 
Year Investment (€ in millions) Renewables 
2008 18,406 1484 (8%) 
2009 8655 1031(12%) 
2010 8286 1163 (14%) 
2011 6524 1114 (17%) 
2012 6997 1791 (26%) 
2013 8086 1028 (13%) 
2014 4633 1222 (26%) 
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Table 6. RWE–overall investment and share of investment in renewables [49,57–61]. 
Year Investment (€ in Millions) RWE Innogy 
2008 5693 1102 (19%) 
2009 15,637 733 (5%) 
2010 6643 709 (11%) 
2011 7702 891 (12%) 
2012 5544 1093 (20%) 
2013 4624 1083 (23%) 
2014 3440 738 (21%) 
Table 7. EnBW–overall investment and share of investment in renewables [51,62–64]. 
Year Investment (€ in millions) Renewable Investment EnBW 
2009 4374.1 153.7 (4%) 
2010 2327.9 536.4 (23%) 
2011 1319.0 216.6 (16%) 
2012 877.4 121.6 (14%) 
2013 1108.3 316.5 (29%) 
2014 1956.7 610.8 (31%) 
In the past, Vattenfall has formulated rolling investment plans for a five-year period. The company 
initially budgeted SEK 147 billion for the period 2012–2016 then in 2013 amended investment plans to 
SEK 105 billion for the period 2014–2018 [65]. More recently, as markets have become characterised 
by over-capacity in production and low prices, the company has decided to limit its most recent 
investment plan to two years (2015–2016) and to invest SEK 41 billion over that period, of which SEK 
30.8 billion, or 75%, will be invested in electricity and heat production. A large amount will be 
invested in wind energy (SEK 9.1 billion), whereas investments in fossil fuel production were 
determined several years ago under completely different market conditions [50]. The aim of the 
company is to reduce its CO2 exposure to 65 million tonnes of absolute emissions by 2020  
(in 2014 the CO2 emissions amounted to 82.3 million tonnes, in 2010 they totalled 94 million tonnes). 
To achieve this target, the company has a two-part strategy: the divestment of fossil-based production 
and growth and investment in renewable production [50].  
Even so, these figures somewhat pale in comparison to the total investment in renewable energies in 
Germany (see Figure 4). In fact, the lion’s share of installed renewable capacity in Germany is not 
owned by the four energy giants. A study by Leuphana University of Luneburg, commissioned by the 
Agency for Renewable Energies [66], assessed the ownership structures of installed renewable energy 
production. Researchers concluded that the largest share (47%) of installations was owned by  
‘citizen energy’ (community or local ownership, citizen-owned power stations and sole proprietors). 
An equally impressive 41% share was owned by what the study called institutional and strategic 
investors–companies involved in industrial production processes or service providers. The study 
concluded that only 12% of installed renewable energy capacity was owned by energy suppliers, 
including the four companies examined in this paper. Figure 5 shows the distribution as put forward in 
the study.  
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Figure 4. Development of investments in construction of renewable energy installations in Germany [20]. 
 
Figure 5. Installed capacity of renewable energies in Germany in 2012 as per  
property owner [29] * (* Coops stands for ‘energy cooperatives’: community-owned 
renewables projects). 
The current business model featured by the four companies examined in this paper is often regarded 
as unsustainable and out of step with governmental climate targets. Furthermore, the carbon content of 
the companies’ energy production is no longer only examined by governments and monitored by  
non-governmental organisations, but now also evaluated by the financial sector [6]. 
In 2003, the German WestLB, a former regional state bank, published a study with the  
title “Von Economics zu Carbonomics–Value at Risk durch Klimawandel” (From Economics to 
Carbonomics–Value at Risk caused by Climate Change) in which it analysed the response of the 
financial sector to expected climate regulation such as the Kyoto Protocol coming into force or the 
introduction of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Organisations such as the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP), which discloses the greenhouse gas emissions of major corporations, 
underline this interest. “When the financial services industry–which focuses like a laser on return on 
investment–starts worrying about the environment, something big is happening” [36]. 
In this paper, we have examined the influence of the fossil fuel divestment campaign on the four largest 
German electricity companies. We found that four entirely different influencers were more powerful in 
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drawing attention to climate policies and their consequences at corporate board meetings than the aims of 
the divestment movement. These influencers were: electricity prices, company ownership, government 
regulation and domestic energy sources. We thus conclude that the campaign does not currently directly 
influence decision making at the German energy giants enough to alter the structure of the German 
electricity mix. Of course, our analysis provides only a snapshot and over time this campaign may well 
gain more influence in Germany. There is already some movement in the four big electricity companies 
towards renewable energy production. Up until a few years ago those companies were able to pursue their 
business model with fossil fuels and nuclear energy alone, despite Germany’s strong civil movement which 
has been vociferously against nuclear energy. With the new social movement that is the fossil fuel 
divestment campaign another cause must be factored into company business decisions. 
The possible influence the campaign actually has will depend on global climate policy. The consulting 
firm Mercer points out that: “It is clear from our survey that credible and consistent climate change 
legislation and regulation is required to drive greater integration of climate change into investment 
practices and to provide the major impetus for a shift from high carbon to low carbon investment. 
Without strong climate policy that provides transparency, longevity and clarity for investors, the 
revolution that is called for in transforming our energy systems will not be possible” [67]. A first step, a 
“golden opportunity”, was described by the IMF’s fiscal affairs head and former finance minister of 
Portugal, Vitor Gaspar [25]. He suggested taking advantage of low oil and coal prices and phasing out 
subsidies of global fossil fuels, which would reduce the global CO2 emissions by more than 20% [26]. 
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